1. What is the Wager needed for?

There are many arguments for God’s existence (five Thomistic ways, fine-tuning, the moral one etc.), but all of them are purely rational. I doubt that they convince many to believe. They seem more like intellectual exercises.

Maybe some people obtain faith through rigorous reflections on whether the causation can proceed in an infinite regress or not. But the overwhelming majority do not disbelieve because they hold profound refutations of God’s existence. Rather, they simply do not see, what faith is for, what benefit it brings.

Pascal’s Wager matters precisely because it is an argument from motivation. Instead of abstract reasoning, it appeals to the will, the prime mover of the soul, which always seeks the greater good and never wants to miss it.

The Wager shows that belief is mathematically justified. If there is a chance to obtain infinite gain without sacrificing much, one should wager on that chance, even if the probability is as low as one in a million.

2. The argument from pluralism

A common objection to the Wager runs like this:

We have hundreds of religions and gods, which one exactly should I bet on? If I choose wrongly, the correct god will count me as a heathen and cast me into hell. Since the odds of making the right guess are minuscule, it seems better not to wager at all.

I respond:

a) Religions may be numerous, but their core conceptions are not. If we reduce each one to its fundamental claims, the set becomes much smaller. And within that set, few actually promise personal and everlasting joy. That leaves only a handful of strong candidates.

b) However, the original Wager did not address that problem indeed. In the historical context of 17th-century France, the choice was effectively between Catholicism and atheism, other options were not taken seriously.

Today the religious landscape is more diverse. In this sense, Pascal’s Wager is somewhat outdated and it is fair to admit that.

c) Thus, I propose reformulating the Wager around general theism. We should bet on the existence of omnipotent, all-good, personal God and believe in him, because only such a God can grant the hope of eternal life.

God must be:

– Almighty, to conquer our death, bring us to heaven, and to protect effortlessly from any lesser gods and their claims,

– All-good, to love us and will our good,

– Personal, to seek relationship and preserve our identity, rather than dissolving it into a pantheistic absolute.

d) The choice of a particular religion should not be part of the Wager. This belongs to a separate missionary task. It makes no sense to urge someone to convert to the Christianity if he does not even believe that God exists. Once a person has at least become a theist, then he may be interested to know that the God he believes in once walked the earth as a man.

3. The argument from self-interest

Another common objection to Pascal’s Wager:

Such faith is egotistic and insincere. God will see that you believe out of profit instead of pure love for him, and will reject or even punish you.

I respond:

a) Humans do everything, from moving mountains to twitching a finger, in pursuit of some good. This “ontological egotism” has nothing to do with moral selfishness; it simply constitutes human nature.

To believe for gain is not inherently wrong. Faith can be rational and at the same time sincere.

b) Few are truly capable of “pure love for God”. Those who claim it often love secondary goods tied to faith, rather than God himself. Pure love is possible, but it requires a certain degree of holiness, which cannot be demanded – especially from those who do not even believe yet.

c) Even those who love God in truth, still desire something: to reach God and be with him. So, they wish to obtain certain good as well, and this is natural.

d) The Church teaches that there are three possible ways of relating to God: slave (believing out of fear), hireling (out of profit), and son (of love). It is true that the mercenary’s way is less noble than the son’s. Yet it is perfectly viable and surpasses the way of the slave.

Also, an honest mercenary may through grace come to love his captain as a son.

e) The very capacity for reasoning is God’s gift. If a person correctly estimated the preciousness of faith, what is there to punish? God can even commend that. It is quite possible that lucid and rational faith is more pleasing to him than a blind one.

4. The argument from presumption

Another common objection:

If only an omnibenevolent God is worth believing in, wouldn’t such a God grant me a good outcome anyway? He cannot cast me to hell only because I did not believe in him, while leading a virtuous life. Thus, believing is not necessary.

I respond:

a) Suppose that God indeed wills you good, but his perfect goodness means that he respects your liberty so much that he cannot save you without your willing cooperation. Is this possible? Yes. Then it is better to believe and cooperate.

An all-good God will wait for a free response. Dismissing faith will mean dismissing relationship. “I ignored him all my life, but he is good, so he will forgive me, right”? Yes, he will, but there will be no bond.

b) Suppose that the ever-loving God does not cast into hell, but since you never cooperated with him in the perfection of your soul, he will also be unable to lead you into heaven. Instead you may simply perish. Is that possible? Yes. Can you overcome death and attain eternity by your own powers? No. Thus, believing is better.

5. The argument from laziness

The final objection is:

What if it turns out that God does not exist after all, and I will have wasted my life under useless religious restraints?

I respond:

a) The resources and time required for faith are far less than those spent on healthcare, education, work etc.

b) Indeed, the investment will not pay off. This outcome is a loss. Still, life in faith brings much gain: meaning, community, moral foundation, undying hope. In a way, the believer’s life is always richer.

These secondary gains will not redeem the final misery, but in that case the misery awaits believers and unbelievers alike. And if we are all doomed to hopeless eternal nothingness – then, in my opinion, it does not really matter how exactly you spent the fleeting moment of life.

6. Conclusion

Let’s summarize. The updated Pascal’s Wager – so to say, “Chernysh’s Wager” that can work today and remain effective:

– States that one must wager on faith in all-good, almighty, personal God. This may give us eternity, while in earthly life it grants meaning and immense hope.

– Can be seen as calculated bet. The expected value is infinitely greater than the expenses. Such rationality does not equal insincerity and may even please God, for it is he who gave us the power of reason.

– Does not require hellmongering. The risk of missing infinite gain (eternal life) and being left with Nothing is infinitely negative in itself. A human has no power whatsoever to secure life after death, except by believing in God.

– Covers only the fundamental choice between theism and non-theism. Its target group is those who do not believe in God but are open to doubt. Islam, Judaism, Christianity, or branches of Christianity are questions outside the framework of this Wager.

May the merciful God grant us wisdom to trust His unfailing goodness and by His grace never perish but attain life everlasting. Amen.